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NOTES
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH OF MINOR CHILDREN
I. INTRODUCTION
The proper measure of damages recoverable for the
wrongful death of a minor child is the subject of much
controversy in our courts. No formula, either legislative
or judicial, which will assure adequate recovery and prevent
excessive jury verdicts in every case has as yet been set
forth. Damages for wrongful death are normally assessed
according to the pecuniary value of the victim. The test
generally used by the courts is to measure the pecuniary
worth of the services which the child would have rendered
during his life and subtract the probable cost of main-
tenance, education and upbringing.'
This measure of damages was formulated in England
in the early 19th century during a gloomy and dehumanized
period when the factory system and child labor flourished.
Justice Smith, in Wycko v. Gnodtke,2 gives a graphic and
nightmarish description of the retrograde social conditions
which existed and describes it as ". . . one of the darkest
chapters in the history of childhood." It is obvious that
changes in our social and economic life have occurred so
that children of today do not render as much service to
their parents as did children in the last century. 3 A
reappraisal and application of damages recoverable for the
wrongful death of a child is therefore necessary to view
the measure of compensation in the light of present day
conditions.
II. HISTORY
At common law a third party had no cause of action
for an injury provoked by the death of another human being
1. See TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT 348 (2d ed. 1913).
2. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
3. Fussner v. Andert, 361 Minn. 347. 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961).
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through a wrongful act;4  the only recourse against the
wrongdoer was through a criminal action. It was sometimes
said that the tort merged in the felony, but this was simply
that the right of action for personal injuries died with the
victim. 5 It was, therefore, to the wrongdoer's financial
benefit if his injured victim died.6 The harsh result was
that death, the most grievous of all injuries, left the bereav-
ed family of the victim w i t h o u t a remedy. To correct
this inequity, Parliament in 1846 enacted Lord Campbell's
Act,7 creating a remedy for wrongful death in favor of
decedent's personal representative as a sort of statutory
trustee for the benefit of certain specified relatives. While
the Act did not provide a yardstick by which damages were
to be measured, it remained for the leading case of Blake
v. The Midland Ry. Co.8 to harshly limit the award of
damages to pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries.
The impetus provided by Lord Campbell's Act overcame
the inertia of state governments. Their legislative bodies
were quick to express their dissatisfaction with the archaisms
of the law by the enactment of death statutes which em-
braced the outline, if not' the precise details, of their
English predecessor. Consequently, in this country states
now have a statutory remedy for wrongful death9 modeled
after England's Lord Campbell's Act. 10 It was inevitable
that there should be lack of uniformity in the language
employed in the statutes of the several states and in the
definitive treatment by their courts of the nature and
boundaries of the measure of recovery provided thereby.
However, despite the differences in phraseology, most of
these statutes provide that " . . . the court or jury may
give such damages as the court or jury shall deem fair
and just with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting
from such death." '" A difficulty arises, however, in that
most American Wrongful Death Statutes fail to prescribe,
4. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
5. Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 81 (1606).
6. PROSSER, TORTS 710 (2d ed. 1955); Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester.
43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931) (discussing origin of common-law rule).
7. Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Viet, c. 93.
8. 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852).
9. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 710.
10. TIFFANY, supra note 1, at 30 where the early statutes are com-
pared.
11. See e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.582(2) (1948).
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except in general terms, the elements of damage to be
recovered. 12  Several Courts have strictly applied the
statutes and have limited recovery to the common concept
of pecuniary loss, i.e., the loss by the beneficiaries of the
support and contributions which the decedent probably
would have contributed to them during the remainder of
his life expectancy. 1 3  Another measure of recovery for
wrongful death of a minor in some other jurisdictions is
the loss to the decedent's estate. Under this measure three
noticeable variations are found. One, recovery should be
that which the decedent probably would have earned if he
had remained alive minus his own living expenses. 14 Two,
recovery is the present worth of the amount the decedent
would probably have saved during the remainder of his
life expectancy. 15 And three, the measure of recovery is to
be the present worth of the decedent's probable gross
earnings without any deduction for expenses.1
6
The majority of jurisdictions permit the parents of a
deceased minor child to recover for loss of services of such
child during minority and also permit recovery for the loss
of possible contributions the child may have made to them
after reaching majority, less the cost of raising, educating
and maintaining the child.1 7  On the other hand, a few
jurisdictions hold that there can be no recovery by the
parents for loss of possible contributions the child might
have made after reaching majority,1 8 nor can the estate
12. Lord Campbell's Act provided that ". .the jury assess such dam-
ages as they think proportioned to the injury resulting from the death to
the parties respectively for whose benefit the action is brought." See
TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 153. Few modern death acts are more
specific, and most of these are essentially copies of the English Act. See
also McCORMICK, DAMAGES 106 (1935).
13. Fisher v. Trester, 119 Neb. 529, 229 N.W. 901 (1930); Tuffy v. Sioux
City Transit Co., 69 S.D. 368, 10 N.W.2d 767 (1943).
14. Louisville & N. Ry. v. Garnett, 129 Miss. 795, 93 So. 241 (1922):
Gurley v. Southern Power Co., 172 N.C. 690, 90 S.E. 943 (1916); Pittman v.
Merriman, 80 N.H. 295, 117 Atl. 18 (1922).
15. Arizona Binghampton Copper Co. v. Dickson, 22 Ariz. 163, 195 Pac.
538 (1921): Florida E. Coast R.E. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914);
Hough v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 169 Iowa 224, 149 N.W. 885 (1914).
16. Michael v. Western & At]. R.R., 175 Ga. 1, 165 S.E. 37 (1932); Lex-
ington Util. Co. v. Parker, 166 Ky. 81, 178 S.W. 1173 (1915).
17. Dawkins v. Chavez, 132 Colo. 61, 285 P.2d 821 (1955), uffirming
McEntyre v. Jones, 128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953), in which the court
concluded that the parents should receive as the net pecuniary loss what
they might have expected from the continuation of the daughter's life.
less the cost of maintaining and educating her.
18. Siebeking v. Ford, 128 Ind. 475, 148 N.E.2d 194 (1958); McFetridge
v. Kurn, 125 S.W.2d 912 (Mo. App. 1939); Frantz v. Gower, 119 Pa. Super.
156, 180 Atl. 716 (1935).
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recover these damages.1 9 These decisions appear to be based
on the theory that the probability of such contributions is
too speculative to be the basis of an award since such
factors as death, marriage, or even a refusal to contribute
might intervene.2 0 Another very common view is that the
mere fact the death was wrongful raises a presumption of
some damages.
21
Generally, the pecuniary-loss theory permits no recovery
by the beneficiaries for loss of society, comfort, and
companionship of the child, 22  or the grief and mental
suffering of the parents 23 on the theory that such injuries
are incapable of being measured by any pecuniary standard.
However, it is important to note that there is a recent
trend to reverse these unduly rigorous views. For instance,
in C a li f o r n i a, 24  Hawaii,2 5 Utah, 2r Virginia,2 7 Idaho, 28
Illinois 29 and Mississippi 30 loss of comfort and society is
considered a pecuniary loss and is compensable as long as
it bears some reasonable relationship to the other losses
in the case. Wisconsin has expressly authorized recovery
for such losses by statute. 31  Moreover, several states also
allow damages for the grief or mental suffering of the
survivors .
22
North Dakota's Wrongful D e a t h Statute 33 provides
simply that " . . . the jury shall give such damages as it
19. Lane v. Hatfield, 173 Ore. 79, 143 P.2d 230, 234 (1943) (The adminis-
trator of the deceased child's estate brought this action in which the
court concluded that the "estate would be entitled only to the accumula-
tion of money and other property derived from her services, earnings, in-
vestments and savings during the period of her life subsequent to the
time when she attained the age of majority").
20. State v. Cohen, 166 Md. 682, 172 Atl. 274 (1934).
21. Karr v. Sixt, 146 Ohio St. 527, 67 N.E.2d 331 (1946); Stevens v.
Schickendanz, 316 P.2d 1111, (Okla. 1957).
22. American R.R. v. Didricksen, 227 U.S. 145 (1913); Louisville, N.A. &
C. Ry. v. Rush, 127 Ind. 545, 26 N.E. 1010 (1891); Kalsow v. Grob, 61 N.D.
119, 237 N.W. 848 (1931).
23. Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382 (1951); Vincent v.
Philadelphia, 348 Pa. 290, 35 A.2d 65 (1944).
24. da Silva v. J. M. Martinac Shipbuilding Corp., 153 Cal. App. 2d 397,
314 P.2d 598 (1957); Bond v. United Railroads, 159 Cal. 270, 113 Pac. 366
(1911).
25. Gabriel v. Margah, 37 Hawaii 571 (1947).
26. Van Cleave v. Lynch, 109 Utah 149, 166 P.2d 244 (1946) (in affirm-
ing award of $10,000 for death of a 6-year-old boy, the court stated that
the damages primarily were for loss of society).
27. Anderson v. Hygeia Hotel Co., 92 Va. 687. 24 S.E. 269 (1896).
28. Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682 (1950).
29. Hall v. Gillins, 13 111. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
30. Delta Chevrolet Co. v. Waid, 211 Miss. 256, 51 So. 2d 443 (1951).
31. Vis. Stat. Ann. § 331.04(4) (1963 Supp.).
32. See, e.g., Coast City Coaches v. Donat, 106 So. 2d 593, (Fla. 1958);
Matthews v. Hicks. 197 Va. 112. 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955).
33. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-21-02 (1961).
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finds proportionate to the injury resulting from the death
to the persons entitled to the recovery" stating nothing as
to what elements the jury is to consider. In Haug v. Great
Northern Railroad Co., 34 the North Dakota Supreme Court
determined that the proper measure of damages recover-
able is the probable value of the services of the child dur-
ing minority, considering the cost of support and mainten-
ance during the early and helpless part of its life. In the
same opinion the court went on to say, "Upon one point
the cases are united, and that is that the only damages
recoverable in this action are for pecuniary loss. Nothing
can be recovered for the loss of society or for damages
in the way of solatium." 35 Thus, the pecuniary-loss theory
as applied to cases where the deceased is a child is open
to criticism, because such cases create uncertainties due to
the difficulty in proving the possible earning power of the
deceased.
3 6
An even greater problem, in proving earning power,
exists today, as a result of high costs involved in the rear-
ing of the child, which normally greatly exceeds any mone-
tary contributions made by him to his family. Thus, it
would be possible in child death situations for the parents
to be denied recovery if the pecuniary loss theory is applied
strictly. The proposition then, that "it is cheaper to kill a
child then an adult," although morbid, would seem realis-
tic. 37
III. THE NEW TREND (WYCKO V. GNODTKE)
Fortunately, a new trend toward more liberal awards
in cases involving the death of a child is being advanced.
This is exemplified in a 1960 landmark decision by the
Michigan Supreme Court in Wycko v. Gnodtke 5 In an
action brought under the Michigan Death Act39  by an
Administrator for the wrongful death of a fourteen-year-old
34. 8 N.D. 23, 77 N.W. 97 (1898).
35. Id. at 101; Aff'd by Scherer v. Schlaberg, 18 N.D. 421, 122 N.W. 1000
(1:909); Steiskal v. Darrow, 55 N.D. 606. 215 N.WV. 83 (1927).
36. See generally, New York Law Revision Commission, 1949 Reports.
Recommendations, and Studies 215.
37. But see 14 A.L.R.2d 550 (1950) for a general discussion. It is noted
that cases show awards as high as $10,000 for children between the ages
of fourteen and twenty-one.
38. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
39. Supra note 11.
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boy the jury awarded $14,000 damages, plus $979.50 for
funeral and burial expenses. The trial judge, using the
pecuniary loss test (earnings of child prior to majority minus
cost of upkeep) ruled that this was excessive and ordered
a new trial unless the plaintiff filed a remittitur, reducing
damages to $7,500, plus the funeral expenses. On appeal,
the order granting a new trial subject to remittitur was
reversed,"° and judgment was entered upon the jury's ver-
dict. The Supreme Court rejected the child-labor theory as
the sole measure of pecuniary-loss, and held that damages
for a child's wrongful death should be based upon "the
pecuniary value of the life ' 41 and that the judgment was
not excessive. The Court said in determining how to as-
certain this value:
. . .we must consider the expenses of birth,
of food, of clothing, of medicines, of instruc-
tions, of nurture and shelter. . .The value of
mutual society and protection, in a word,
companionship. . . Finally, if, in some un-
usual situation, there is in truth . . . a wage-
profit capability in the infant . . . the loss
of such expectation should not be disregard-
ed ...44
2
In Michigan the courts have interpreted their Wrong-
ful Death Action43 accordance with the general rule,44 that
is, permitting beneficiaries to recover for only such econom-
ic injuries as they have sustained due to the loss of services
or probable contributions by the deceased and denying re-
covery for injured feelings, loss of the companionship of
the deceased and mental suffering. 45 The Michigan Court
in Hurst v. Detroit City Railway,4 6 said that the statute
does not imply that pecuniary damage always results from
a negligent killing and the burden of alleging and proving
pecuniary injury was placed upon the plaintiff. In Black
40. Three justices of the eight justice court dissented in this opinion.
41. Supra note 38, at 122.
42. Supra note 38.
43. Supra note 11.
44. TIFFANY, 153, op. cit. supra note 1, at 323.
45. Mynning v. Detroit L. & N. R.R., 59 Mich. 257, 26 N.W. 514 (1886).
46. 84 Mich. 539, 48 N.W. 44 (1892) (negligent killing of one-year-eleven-
month-old child).
1963] NOTES
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v. Michigan Cent. Railroad7 4 a later case, it was held that
the proof necessary, to establish pecuniary injury, was not
the specific proof of the value of loss benefits and cost of
maintenance of the minor; but that general facts were
admissible and that the jury was qualified as well as a
witness to determine the extent of the loss.48 Affirming
also Michigan's long standing rule, the court held in
Corvell v. Colburn49 that parents could not recover for the
probable contributions the deceased child might have made
to her parents after she became twenty-one. Courtney v.
Apple 50 narrowed even more the chances for recovery. In
this case the Michigan Supreme Court as late as 1956 held
that a verdict of $700, the amount of funeral and burial
expenses, was sufficient to compensate the parents of a
three-year-old boy killed by the defendant's negligently
driven automobile. In explanation the Court said that it was
quite possible for the jury to find that the cost of raising
the child would exceed his probable contributions. As a
dissenter in that case, Justice Smith, who wrote the majority
opinion in the Wycko case, pointed out that had the defend-
ant killed a bull on the highway the owner could recover
its actual value, but this child's parents, under the child-
labor measure of recovery, were not entitled to any damages
at all. In his Wycko opinion, he criticized those jurists
who would without reservation place values on wrongfully
destroyed machinery or farm animals, but who on the
other hand refuse to face the problem of fairly evaluating
the life of a human being. "This kind of delicacy would
prevent the distribution of food to the starving because the
sight of hunger is so sickening." 51 He spoke of the change
which has taken place in the parent-child relationships
throughout the years and condemned the harsh child-wage
47. 146 Mich. 568, 109 N.W. 1052 (1906) (negligent killing of seven-year-
old boy).
48. "In the case of Black v. Railroad Co., this court did not hold that
such evidence, as above referred to, was not admissible, but did hold that
where evidence had been given as to the age, calling, and condition of
the health of the father, and of the age and condition of the mother, to-
gether with evidence that the child was healthy, intelligent, and of good
disposition, and obedient to its parents, that was sufficient to authorize an
award of substantial damages, and the courts in that case, refused to
set aside a verdict of $1,500 damages." Sceba v. Manistee Ry., 189 Mich.
308, 320, 155 N.W. 414, 417 (1915).
49. 308 Mich. 240, 13 N.W.2d 275 (1944).
50. 345 Mich. 223, 76 N.W.2d 80 (1956).
51. Supra note 38, at 118, 122.
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damage measure on the grounds that it was an outmoded
result of the industrial revolution in England when "loss
meant only money loss, and money loss from the death of
a child meant only lost wages.
5 2
The superlative opinion of the Wycko case announced
a new and enlightened formula for measuring damages in
child-death cases. It replaced the unconscionable child-
labor formula with an infinitely superior rule entitling the
parents to recover for their "lost investment" in their child
and for loss of his "companionship." While clearing the
books in Michigan of the harsh child-labor measure of dam-
ages for child death, Justice Smith declared in a coruscat-
ing phrase, "The bloodless bookkeeping imposed upon our
juries by the savage exploitations of the last century must
no longer be perpetuated by our courts.
' '5 3
Following the Wycko decision, the Minnesota Supreme
Court, in Fussner v. Andert,54 construed its Wrongful Death
Statute 55 as being remedial in character and should be
construed in light of current social conditions. Speaking
for the majority, Justice Murphy, in an elaborate opinion,
reiterated the conditions which existed at the time of the
adoption of Lord Campbell's Act. He pointed out that in
applying the barbaric child-labor measure of damages in
this day and age would have the effect of reading children
out of the death acts. Concerning the recoverable dam-
ages the court said:
"We cannot agree that loss of earnings,
contributions, and services in terms of dol-
lars represents the only real loss the parent
sustains by the death of his child. With
the passage of time the significance of money
loss has been diminished. Conversely, there
is a growing appreciation of the true value
to the parent of the rewards which flow from
the family relationship and are manifested
in acts of material aid, comfort, and assist-
ance which were once considered to be only
of sentimental character. ' .6
52. Id. at 124.
53. Supra note 38, at 124.
54. 361 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961).
55. Minn. St. Ann. § 573-02(1) (1947) (provides that "...the recovery in
1963] NOTES
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Prior to the Fussner case the Minnesota decisions expressed
the view that the statute did not comprehend pecuniary
compensation for loss of comfort or companionship of a
relative nor for the pain and suffering of the deceased. 57
The liberalizing trend was somewhat furthered by the
luminous argument in Hoyt v. U. S.1 as to why the cost
of upkeep should not be deducted from the pecuniary value
of the child's life. In that case the court concluded that in
subtracting from the child's expectable contributions the
estimated costs of his upkeep the effect of such a deduction
would, more often than not, result in a minus figure.
In examining the term "pecuniary-loss," the Michigan
courts have expanded the scope and meaning of that term
so as to make it applicable not only to damages resulting
from money loss but to include as well damages for loss
of aid, comfort, and society suffered by the next of kin of
the deceased.5 9 In so doing they haye started a trend away
from the severity of the earlier decisions by taking into
consideration economic realities and rejecting the old child-
labor formula as being obsolete and not in accord with our
present day social values. As a result child death awards
in Michigan in the future may well be more substantial.
Despite the fact that this new trend has accomplished
the desired result of more substantial awards in child death
cases, it seems inevitable that it will be confronted with
other problems. Will it remove the fictions inherent in the
present pecuniary-loss test? Will it result in small or nom-
inal verdicts in cases involving very young children? Will
it, because of the emotional nature of unlawful death actions,
result in excessive verdicts? These problems are not new
ones, nor have they been created by this new trend. Courts
and juries have always experienced very difficult problems
in determining the pecuniary-loss to parents as a result of
the wrongful death of their children. Standards applicable
such action is such an amount as the jury deems fair and just in reference
to the pecuniary loss resulting from such death").
56. Suprai note 54, at 359.
57. Bolinger v. St. Paul & D.R. Co., 36 Minn. 418, 420, 31 N.W.- 856
(1887); Bremer v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 96 Minn. 469, 470.
105 N.W. 494 (1905).
58. 286 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1961).
59. Supra note 38.
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when the deceased is an adult such as services, income °
and other factors are inapplicable in cases which involve
a child who has received no wages and developed few mature
habits. Although the recent trend does not afford answers
to all the problems, the obvious conclusion would seem to
be that it is a credit to the old standard of scrupulous
adherence to the pecuniary-loss test, while the child-labor
measure of damages, which would ordinarily preclude any
recovery in a child death action as the value of the modern
child's services lost, would be far less then the probable
cost of his upbringing. 61 When damages are recovered by
the application of pecuniary-loss test, it necessarily implies
a fiction, thus recoveries must actually be based upon other
considerations, taken by the jury, which are probably emo-
tional factors.6 2 Although the awarding of damages for im-
palpable emotional harms is in accord with the modern
trend in the field of torts,63 it is believed that if the various
state legislatures desire a pecuniary-loss test to remain the
basis for recovery in such cases the fictional aspects of its
application should be removed.6 4
It is suggested that a statutory minimum recovery, as
has been enacted in other states, 5 would aid the courts
in those cases where parents can prove little economic loss.
The parents have sustained some loss which should be
compensated for and the minimum requirement would re-
move the courts from having to draw fine lines where the
evidence of loss is minute. And too, if a state is burdened
with the fear that verdicts may become excessive it may,
as Wisconsin did,66 limit the amount recoverable by a
'statutory provision.
60. Director General of Railroads v. Platt, 265 F. 918 (2d Cir. 1920);
Perry v. Ryback, 302 Pa. 559, 153 Atl. 770 (1931).
61. Graham v. Consolidated Traction Co., 62 N.J.L. 90, 40 Atl. 773 (1898),
is an early case taking the view that in a majority of cases the money
spent for the benefit of the child would be far in excess of the amount
received from him.
62. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952);
Chicketts v. Bowman, iupra note 28.
63. PROSSER, -op. cit. supra note 6, at 177.
64. Barnett v. Cohen, 2 K.B. 461 (1921) (recovery was denied since
under the English law there must be a reasonable probability rather than
a mere possibility that the child will earn money or give help to his
parents).
65. R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-7-2 (1956) requires a minimum recovery of
$5,000; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. § 229(2) (1962 Supp.) provides for a mini-
mum damage award of $3,000.
66. Supra note 31. (The statute requires recovery not to exceed $3,000
for loss of society and companionship).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Michigan approach seems to be a commendable
one as it squarely faces the problem and recognizes that
the death of a child results in loss of love, affection and
solace, not money. It has been frank and realistic in its
admission that recovery is being allowed for parental grief
which results from the wrongful death of a child. Many
of our present statutes which provide for strict application
of the pecuniary-loss test are in need of revision and juris-
dictions facing this situation might do well to follow the
initial step taken by Michigan in a liberalizing direction.
A more practical route may be suggested however, that
is, by legislative revision rather than judicial. Such revision
could be accomplished by the enactment of a statute which
expressly authorizes a prescribed award of a reasonable
amount for mental suffering and/or loss of society and com-
panionship in addition to any pecuniary loss under the ser-
vices of the minor which might reasonably have been ex-
pected from the child. This would have the effect of re-
moving the great range of discretion now employed by
juries and reviewing judges and result in a more practical
means for arriving at substantial though not abusive awards.
RICHARD G. MANN
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